1 2 3 4 5 6	REBECCA BRUCH, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 7289 LEMONS, GRUNDY & EISENBERG 6005 Plumas Street, Third Floor Reno, Nevada 89519 (775) 786-6868; (775)786-9716 (fax) Email: rb@lge.net Attorney for Defendant Nye County	
7	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
8	DISTRICT OF NEVADA	
9		
10	RONNI BOSKOVICH,	Case No: 2:21-cv-00670-JAD-DJA
11	Plaintiff,	IOINE AND UNOPPOSED
12	v.	JOINT AND UNOPPOSED MOTION TO STAY
13	NYE COUNTY, a political subdivision, and	DISCOVERY
14	municipality including its department, NYE	
15	COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE; CHRIS ARABIA, in his individual	
16	and official capacity; LEO BLUNDO, in his	
17	individual and official capacity; DOES I-50; and ROE CORPORATIONS I-50,	
18		
19	Defendants.	
-/		-

The parties through their counsel of record, Michael Balaban, Esq., on behalf of Plaintiff Ronni Boskovich ("Boskovich"); Brian Hardy, Esq., of Marquis Aurbach Coffing, on behalf of Nye County District Attorney Chris Arabia ("Arabia") and Nye County Commissioner Leo Blundo ("Blundo"); and Rebecca Bruch, Esq., of Lemons, Grundy & Eisenberg, on behalf of Nye County ("the County"), do hereby file this Joint and Unopposed Motion to Stay Discovery Plan and Scheduling Order.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

The basis for this Joint and Unopposed Motion to Stay Discovery is two-fold: First, Boskovich admittedly has filed this complaint before she has exhausted her administrative

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remedies. According to Boskovich, she did so in order to preserve the statute of limitations on her other claims. More specifically, she has not yet received a right-to-sue letter regarding the three Title VII claims she has brought. Second, Defendants Blundo and Arabia have filed a Motion to Dismiss that could be dispositive on all claims against them. The parties bring this motion jointly and without opposition.

I. Introduction

On December 2, 2020, Boskovich filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Nevada Equal Rights Commission ("NERC") and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Boskovich must exhaust her administrative remedies before she can file a lawsuit. Until she receives a right-to-sue letter addressing those claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, litigation cannot be brought. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e05(f)(1). As is her right, Boskovich has requested her EEOC file be closed without a finding, and that a right-to-sue letter be issued. She avers in her Complaint that she has not received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 14-15. As of the filing of this Motion, she has not received a right-to-sue letter.

In Boskovich's Complaint filed April 22, 2021, she asserted 10 causes of action related to her termination from the Nye County District Attorney's Office. ECF No. 1. Those claims are:

- 1. Sex/Gender Discrimination in Violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
- 2. Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment in Violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
- 3. Retaliation in Violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
- 4. Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy
- 5. Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Equal Protection
- 6. Breach of Implied-In-Fact Contract
- 7. Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Delaing
- 8. Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage
- 9. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

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10. Defamation

In response, on June 2, 2021, Blundo and Arabia filed a Motion to Dismiss all causes of action pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6). ECF No. 6. The County filed its Answer on June 28, 2021. ECF No. 11.

Blundo and Arabia argue in their Motion to Dismiss, in addition to the failure to exhaust administrative remedies, that the Complaint should be dismissed because (1) Boskovich has failed to state a viable § 1983 claim against Blundo and Arabia; (2) Boskovich did not allege facts which are plausibly suggestive of a claim for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage against Blundo and Arabia; (3) Boskovich failed to plead a plausible claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Blundo and Arabia; and (4) Boskovich's defamation claim against Blundo and Arabia fails because it is based wholly on speculation. ECF No. 6. Blundo and Arabia also argue Boskovich should not be allowed to amend her complaint as against them. Blundo and Arabia allege the claims made by Boskovich involve bad faith, harassment, or a dilatory motive. *Id*.

On June 16, 2021, Boskovich opposed the Motion to Dismiss, primarily arguing she has met her burden under *Iqbal* and *Twombly*. ECF No. 11. Boskovich further argues that even if the Court grants the Blundo and Arabia motion, she should have leave to amend the complaint.

II. **Legal Argument**

Courts have broad discretionary power to control discovery. See, e.g., Little v. City of Seattle, 863 F.2s 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1988). The party seeking a stay of discovery carries the heavy burden of making a strong showing why discovery should be denied. See Tradebay, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 278 F.R.D. 597, 601 (D.Nev.2011). In this case all parties agree discovery should be stayed.

Evaluation of a request for a stay often requires a "preliminary peek" at a pending dispositive motion. This "preliminary peek" is not intended to prejudge the outcome, but to evaluate the propriety of a stay of discovery with the goal of accomplishing the

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objectives of Rule 1, which requires construing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a manner to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. *See Tradebay*, 278 F.R.D. at 601. In doing so, a court must consider whether the preliminary peek at the merits is potentially dispositive of the entire case, and whether the motion can be decided without additional discovery. *Id.* at 602-603.

The parties agree that a temporary stay of discovery, including the procedural requirements of FRCP Rule 26, and completion of a discovery plan and scheduling order, will further the goal of judicial economy as well as reducing the costs to the parties in the event the Motion to Dismiss is granted in whole or in part. They do not believe discovery is necessary for the Court to decide the pending motion. In addition, it is without question that Boskovich cannot proceed with her three Title VII claims until she receives a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC.

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UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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